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Economic stimulus programmes can be an incentive for foreign investment, but
many developing countries do not have the ﬁnancial resources to successfully com-
pete with the investment promotion packages of developed countries. Once the Cen-
tral and Eastern European (CEE) countries acceded to the eurozone, they will lose
their monetary instruments to adjust the macroeconomic imbalances. Using linear
regression, this article presents the impact of the ﬁscal and monetary policies on
attracting the foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Romania, based on monthly data
series during 2000–2010. Based on economic literature and on such empiric analysis,
the article will propose some directions for the Romanian macroeconomic policy in
the short-term in the context of crisis, because the FDIs are the engine for recovery
and economic growth. In Romania, empiric results have shown that monetary factors
such as higher interest rates and higher inﬂation attracted FDIs. Fiscal factors (mainly
direct taxes) seem to play a less important role, being relevant only in the long-term.
So, Romania should also focus on improving the other non-ﬁnancial factors that
greatly inﬂuence the investment environment here (infrastructure, legal and political
stability). Only then can the ﬁscal stimulus be effective in attracting FDIs and sup-
porting the economic growth in the same time. The article begins with presenting
some ﬁndings from the economic literature regarding taxation and FDIs, it then fol-
lows the empiric analysis for Romania and ends with conclusions and some issues
for a further research.
Keywords: foreign direct investments (FDIs); Central and Eastern European
countries (CEE); ﬁnancial macroeconomic policies; Romania
JEL classiﬁcation: F21, F23, G01, G24, G38
1. Introduction
Since the early 1990s developing countries have increasingly liberalised, privatised and
deregulated their service industries, with a view to greater participation in the global
economy. More welcoming policies on foreign direct investments (FDIs) have been a
prominent component of this trend. National policies on FDI typically feature measures
aimed at both attracting and discouraging inﬂows. Policies to attract FDI such as tax
breaks, favourable regulatory treatment and subsidies of various sorts are usually
focused on manufacturing. Meanwhile, policies restricting inward FDI are mainly con-
centrated in the service sector. This increased competition led more countries to their
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present similar conditions before the investors with regard to the ﬁscal regime, qualiﬁca-
tion of working force and infrastructure.
An analysis focused on the impact of the ﬁnancial macroeconomic policies on FDIs
is very important, not only in the current crisis period, but also in the view of acceding
of many Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries to the eurozone. They will lose
the instruments of the monetary policy and will be based only on the ﬁscal-budgetary
policy and wages policy which depends also on the ﬁscal ratio. The current crisis
proved that in many cases, monetary policy seemed to be an inefﬁcient way to ﬁght
against recession and to boost the economic activity, because investors, and people
generally, became very prudent regarding investments, and even about consumption.
FDIs are the engine for economic recovery and economic growth. They are respon-
sible for the technological spillovers in the host economy, by the increase of the labour
productivity and of export competitiveness and the transfer of know-how.
So, based on the ﬁndings of economic literature and the experience of other devel-
oped European countries, the aim of this article is to test empirically the impact of the
ﬁscal and budgetary policy on FDIs in Romania. Using linear regression, this article
presents the impact of the ﬁscal, budgetary and monetary factors on attracting FDIs in
Romania, based on monthly data series during 2000–2010. Based on economic literature
and on such empiric analysis, the article will propose some directions for the Romanian
economic policy in the short-term in the context of crisis and in the long-term, after we
adopt the euro and will not have an autonomous monetary policy and will be based
only on ﬁscal policy. There are also some important directions for future research
regarding the impact of the ﬁscal policy and some important non-ﬁnancial factors
(infrastructure, legal and political stability) on FDIs.
A series of studies in European countries suggests that taxation has a relatively low
impact on FDIs as a result of reduced inﬂuence of taxes on relocation costs (Edmiston,
Mudd, and Valev, 2003). Other authors show that a high level of corporate income tax
discourages FDI inﬂows even though other factors, including volume and quality of
goods and services, would be favourable to attracting FDIs. Thus, further analysis of
FDIs ﬂows between seven origin countries of multinational companies (Austria,
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and the US) and eight host countries
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania)
during 1995–2003, Christian Bellak and Markus Leibrecht concluded that corporate
income tax is a key factor in location decisions of foreign companies, having almost
equal importance as the labour cost factor. A one percentage point reduction in the
effective rate of corporate income tax may lead to a maximum increase FDI inﬂows by
4.5% (Leibrecht and Bellak, 2005).
Bénassy-Quéré, Fontagné, and Lahrèche-Révil (2001) studied the sensitivity of FDI
from the tax rates for 11 OECD countries over the period 1984–2000 and they con-
cluded that tax rates play a signiﬁcant role in investment location for FDIs. Disputes
about the importance of corporate taxation on FDIs location are lit, especially because
many empirical studies regarding the elasticity of FDI to corporate taxation have
focused most often on the issue of taxation.
The aim of this article is to analyse if the ﬁscal and budgetary factors impacted greatly
on FDIs attracted to Romania in the last decade, including the crisis period. Romania is a
developing CEE country that needs FDIs to develop. Economic literature has shown that
ﬁscal incentives, spending for infrastructure and the depreciation of the national currency
are important, but they cannot compensate for the lack of other important factors of the
business environment, especially now, in such acerb competition, when all the countries
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have used their tax incentives to become more friendly for the foreign investors. CEE
countries focused on lowering tax, to attract FDIs, but there were other factors they could
not improve, especially in the less developed CEE countries. And that was reﬂected by the
FDIs outﬂows during the crisis period. Moreover, some CEE countries that avoided the
crisis have invested in intensive sectors and oriented the FDIs inﬂows mainly to exports.
But Romania and Bulgaria could not succeed in retaining the large FDIs attracted before
the crisis, although they have the lowest tax on proﬁt levels among CEE countries. The
foreign investors did not consider these countries as stable ones. So, the question is
whether lowering the tax, especially corporate tax on proﬁts, can be the best, most efﬁcient
solution for these countries in their race to attract FDIs in the future? There are other taxes
paid by the companies to the budget that are not appealing for the foreign investors and
there is also corruption and bureaucracy. In Romania, there were a few Greenﬁeld invest-
ments. Most of FDIs were mergers and acquisitions and reinvested proﬁts. And most of
them were attracted by the ﬁscal incentives and inﬂation rate that increased the companies’
proﬁts. High interest rates and a depreciated national currency were also important for
attracting the foreign investors. But some of these investments ﬂowed away during the
crisis period. They didn’t support Romanian economic recovery. So, what will be the
solution for Romania in the future? Once it enters the eurozone, it will not have the mone-
tary instruments to support FDIs inﬂows. And how efﬁcient is the direct and indirect tax
or budgetary spending in attracting FDIs? Can Romania be based only on its ﬁscal and
budgetary policy in becoming more appealing to foreign investors? This question is valid
for all developing countries, especially the ones that do not have their own currency. The
empiric analysis shows the ﬁnancial factors which impact more on FDIs in the short- and
the long-term. The conclusions of such an analysis are important for designing an invest-
ment policy in the near future, mainly in the crisis context when countries face so many
ﬁnancial constraints.
Section 2 presents the ﬁndings of the economic literature regarding the use of the
tax policy to attract FDIs and some evidence from European emerging countries or
developed countries, to see the arguments for and against the efﬁciency of the ﬁscal pol-
icy for attracting FDIs. Recently many authors have supported the idea that tax policy
seems to be less and less efﬁcient and some other non-ﬁnancial factors are more impor-
tant in the actual context. Section 3 presents the econometric results of the linear regres-
sion and VAR techniques built for FDIs that show the impact of the ﬁscal and
budgetary instruments on FDIs and comments the ﬁndings for Romania. The results for
Romania are in line with the literature review and the experiences of the European
countries in the last decade. Section 4 concludes the article and presents some important
directions for a future research regarding the impact of the ﬁscal policy and some
important non-ﬁnancial factors (infrastructure, legal and political stability) on FDIs.
2. The impact of the ﬁscal policy on the foreign investments. Literature review
In recent years, the globalisation process and the gradual elimination of barriers to capi-
tal movements, including FDIs, across countries have led to the emergence of new
issues. In the presence of international capital mobility, home-country corporate income
tax rates and rules about how taxes paid in the host country are considered at home
should inﬂuence FDIs. In fact, such inﬂuence was recognised a long time ago by the
bilateral agreements that were signed to avoid double taxation of income between
countries.
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A home country’s taxation rules affect the effectiveness of tax incentives in the host
country. Most FDI outﬂows originate from OECD countries, with different regimes on
how they tax the activities of their multinationals abroad. For example, the foreign tax
paid by US companies can be claimed as a tax credit on the US tax liabilities (up to a
rate of 35%). Japan and the UK use similar tax credit systems, while other countries
such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany and the Netherlands exempt more or less
any proﬁts earned abroad from home taxation (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000, pp. 1–34).
Hines (1999, pp. 305–322) found that it is attractive for US ﬁrms to use debt to
ﬁnance foreign investment in high tax countries (compared to the US) and equity in
low tax countries. The argument is that the debt generates interest deductions for the
subsidiary and so reduces its taxable income in the host country (note that the parent
ﬁrm has to pay additional taxes, but at a lower rate, in the US). Finally, the importance
of the home country tax system can also be illustrated by the efforts of tax authorities
to prevent the transfer of multinationals’ headquarters or other speciﬁc activities (such
as R&D) to other countries.
In recent years, there has been new empirical evidence that tax rates and incentives
inﬂuence the location decision of companies within regional economic groupings, such
as the EU, NAFTA, or ASEAN. The location decision of foreign companies within the
US has also retained the attention of several researchers (Swensson, 1994, pp. 67–83).
As an illustration of this effect, it was found that the average effective tax rate plays a
signiﬁcant role in the decision of US companies to locate within Europe.
Haaparanta (1996, pp. 54–70) shows that countries will engage in a tax bidding pro-
cess to attract FDIs, if their key motivation is to create jobs. The same reasoning could
apply to research and development (R&D). Countries with large domestic markets are
capable of taxing more FDIs because they beneﬁt from positive agglomeration effects
but this advantage decreases with lower trade costs, as may happen within regional
grouping and Trade Unions. Overall, the outcome of tax competition is generally ambig-
uous because it depends on many factors.
Tax competition seems to be more intensive in some sectors such as automotive and
larger ﬁrms. In any case, both the European Union and OECD have declared that tax
competition is harmful to countries. However, this view has to be contrasted with the
argument that variations in tax regimes are a good thing because they give tax payers
more choice, and thus more chance of being satisﬁed, as well as some pressure on gov-
ernments to compete by offering different combinations of public services and taxes
(Oman, 2000, pp. 28–77).
Recent efforts to harmonise tax systems have been launched both in the industrial
and developing world (the EU and some African countries). Even if tax incentives were
quite effective in increasing investment ﬂows, the costs might well outweigh the bene-
ﬁts. This competition is not only taking place in relatively wealthy industrial countries
but also in emerging markets where governments generally face severe budgetary
constraints (Bellak, Leibrecht, and Stehrer, 2009b, pp. 19–46).
There is no doubt that tax incentives are costly. The ﬁrst and most direct costs are
those associated with the potential loss of revenues for the host government. Incentives
can be further counterproductive if they contribute to attracting more investors of the
‘wrong kind’, which is certainly the case in countries where basic fundamentals are not
yet in place. They have also been signiﬁcant sources of corruption, effectively screening
out desirable investment, and detrimental to the processes of developing competitive
markets and sound policymaking. One has to keep in mind, however, that successful
examples like Singapore or Ireland are rare (Morisset and Pirnia, 2000, pp. 1–30).
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But ﬁscal and budgetary factors are not the only ones that impact on FDIs. There
are also monetary factors (important for the transition countries, but with limited effect
in the long-term, especially after those countries enter the eurozone) or external trade
factors in relation with FDIs (bi-directional relation with FDIs). Regarding some
important monetary factors for FDIs, Coskun (2001, pp. 221–226) suggests that lower
inﬂation and interest rates coupled with other factors such as ‘full membership with the
EU’ and high economic growth can attract foreign investors and increase the FDI inﬂow
into Turkey. Wint and Williams (2002) show that a stable economy attracts more FDIs,
thus a low inﬂation environment is desired in countries that promote FDIs as a source
of capital ﬂow. The inﬂation performance of emerging markets (including CEE coun-
tries), measured by the share of countries that had less than 10% annual inﬂation
improved signiﬁcantly during the last decade and several studies, including Dabla-Norris
et al. (2010, pp. 1–32), ﬁnd a positive impact of a low inﬂation environment on FDI
inﬂows. Among the set of pull factors that were considered for the emerging economies,
lowering corporate tax rates, tariffs and a stable exchange rate were found to be statisti-
cally important determinants of FDI inﬂows (Arbatli, 2011, pp.1–25).
A host country’s economic instability can be a major deterrent to FDIs inﬂow. Any
form of instability introduces a form of uncertainty that distorts investors’ perceptions
on the future proﬁtability in that country (Erramilli and D’Souza, 1995, pp. 47–60).
Akinboade, Siebrits, and Roussot (2006) state that:
… low inﬂation is taken to be a sign of internal economic stability in the host country.
High inﬂation indicates the inability of the government to balance its budget and the failure
of the central bank to conduct appropriate monetary policy. (pp, 177–209)
Some literature offers some distinctions on the level of inﬂation. Rogoff and Reinhart
(2003, pp. 1–43) ﬁnd that high inﬂation does not happen in the absence of other macro-
economic problems. The cost of inﬂation can have prominent effects on the economy’s
growth. This hindrance is more prominent at an inﬂation rate of 40% and higher, but
they also note that a country with a higher inﬂation rate, especially below the 40%
level, is worse off than a country with slightly lower inﬂation rate.
Glaister and Atanasova (1998, pp. 122–134) mention the effect high inﬂation had on
employment in Bulgaria. Although they did not draw direct inferences to the relation-
ship between FDIs and inﬂation, they seem to suggest that high inﬂation can cause
various problems within the country to reduce its attractiveness to foreign investors.
Goldfajn and Olivares (2001, pp. 1–22) ﬁnd that developing countries would allow
a higher volatility of reserves and interest rate in exchange for a low volatility on their
exchange rate in order to compete for FDIs.
A study on developed and developing countries (Kiat, 2008, pp. 1–85) shows that
the relationship between FDIs and exchange rates were found to be inconclusive. Expert
interviews suggest that research methodology should be reﬁned and the result may
prove that a devaluation of currency can induce FDI inﬂow. The data ﬁnds that high
inﬂation has a negative impact on FDI inﬂow. The relationship is more signiﬁcant in
developed economies than those in the lesser developed economies, but this can be
attributed to a more volatile economic environment. Based on the data analysis, inﬂation
seems to have more impact on FDIs than exchange rates; thus maintaining inﬂation
stability could ensure economic stability and in turn, stimulate FDIs.
The literature also suggests a wide variety of factors that can inﬂuence FDIs. Given
the current situation of the foreign reserve and current account deﬁcits, experts’ opinions
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suggest that promoting export and strengthening foreign reserve can provide leverage
on exchange rate stability. Real exchange rates may be more important for FDIs if the
investment is oriented towards the export market (Radulescu, Druica, and Omran,
2012a, 435–447) (which is not the case for Romania).
Clausing (2000, pp.190–205) investigates the operations of US multinationals in 29
host countries from 1977–1994 and ﬁnds a strong positive relation between FDIs and
exports. This relationship becomes even more pronounced when multinational activity
and intra-ﬁrm trade is considered. In the analysis of FDIs and exports, Pfaffermayr
(1994, pp. 337–351) employs the Granger-causality procedure and obtains a signiﬁcant
positive causation in both directions. Eaton and Tamura (1994, pp. 1–33) also analyse
the relationship. They thereby ﬁnd a strong complementary relationship. In contrast,
Andersen and Hainaut (1998, pp.1–24) ﬁnd a complementary relationship for the US,
Japan, and Germany but not for the UK.
Lipsey (2002, pp. 1–20) show a positive relationship between US exports and FDIs for
40 countries in 1970. Furthermore, Brainard (1997, pp.520–544) ﬁnds a strong
conﬁrmation for the ‘proximity-concentration trade-off’ on the industry level for 27 US
markets and identiﬁes that when the income per capita of the partner country catches up to
the US level, FDIs tends to substitute for exports. Fontagné and Pajot (2002, pp. 43–82)
ﬁnd complementary effects between FDI ﬂows and trade on the sector level. The investiga-
tion of the relation between FDI and trade that is diversiﬁed by destination country or
region is an under-researched issue in the empirical literature. Some studies investigating
the relationship between FDIs and exports from developed to developing countries ﬁnd
them to be complementary.
If FDIs are market-seeking, they would have positive inﬂuences on imports into host
economies, and no effect on exports (the case of Romania). For resource-seeking FDIs,
the situation is just the opposite: there is an increase of exports, while imports are unaf-
fected. For strategic asset-seeking FDIs, there are no unambiguous predictions. There is a
same bi-directional argument in the case of FDIs and export. Then there are other concerns
regarding market-seeking (substitute) FDIs or efﬁciency-seeking (complement) FDIs. To
illustrate the causal relationship, several studies (UNCTAD 2001, pp.7–25) suggest that
manufacturing ﬁrms ﬁrst service the foreign markets by trading because trade is easier and
less risky than FDIs. Then gaining knowledge about foreign countries economies, political
and social conditions, the home country ﬁrms establish subsidiaries in foreign markets and
then subsidiary exports. Thus, the FDI-export relation is as complicated as the other
bi-causal discussion (Radulescu, Druica and Omran, 2012b, pp. 329–348).
The early literature attempted to evaluate if a generous tax policy could compensate for
other obstacles in the business environment and, thus, attract multinational companies. In
the mid-1980s, the literature went one step further by exploring what kind of tax instruments
should have the greatest impact on the location decision of multinational companies.
Special attention was also given to the motivations and tax behaviour of the multina-
tional company. Not only have companies tended to become more mobile, but also
governments have to deal with this new dimension in the design of their national tax
policy. The gradual elimination of barriers to capital movements have stimulated
governments to compete for FDIs in global markets as well as reinforced the role of tax
policy in this process. This recent competitive trend has to be offset by the increasing
pressure that governments face to harmonise their tax policies within regional (or inter-
national) agreements. A second important issue has been the recognition that tax poli-
cies of the home and host countries are interconnected and that this link inﬂuences the
behaviour of multinationals. Last but not least, there has been a growing attention to the
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costs associated with tax incentives – and not only to their possible beneﬁts. This issue
has become crucial in emerging countries where budgetary constraints as well as corrup-
tion are certainly more severe than in industrial countries (Pelinescu, Radulescu, and
Caraiani, 2006, pp. 143–161).
The literature has traditionally focused on the instruments linked to the corporate
income tax such as tax holidays and tax allowance. Of course, these instruments are of
no help to an unproﬁtable company and, therefore, other forms of incentives have also
been widely used around the world. Exemptions from custom duties or local indirect
taxes (generally to targeted sectors) do exist in many countries, even though their use
has been restricted in most international and bilateral trade treaties (Morisset and Pirnia,
2000, pp. 1–30).
Incentives will generally neither make up for serious deﬁciencies in the investment
environment. When other factors such as political and economic stability, infrastructure
and transport costs are more or less equal between potential locations, taxes may exert a
signiﬁcant impact. This is evidenced by the growing tax competition in regional group-
ings such as the European Union or at the sub-regional level within one country such as
the US (Clausing and Dorobantu, 2005, pp. 77–103).
A big question for government ofﬁcials in developing and developed countries alike
is the impact of tax, regulatory, and public expenditure policies on foreign investors. An
important study of foreign investment determinants found that agglomeration – mea-
sured by infrastructure quality – is an important determinant while taxes are not a sig-
niﬁcant determinant. In contrast, a growing set of studies on taxation has arisen in the
public ﬁnance literature that generally ﬁnd signiﬁcant tax effects, though the estimated
elasticity varies signiﬁcantly between them depending on the data-set used and whether
the study is cross-sectional or panel. In addition, a large body of literature in regional
public economics suggests that government spending that is beneﬁcial to investors (such
as public investment in infrastructure for foreign investors) should have positive effects
on investment in a region (Bellak, Damijan, and Leibrecht, 2009a, pp. 267–290).
The evidence indicates that lower taxes, lower corruption, lower government con-
sumption spending and better infrastructure attract FDIs, this is supported by the results
of the paper by Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang (2006, pp. 56–63). In conclu-
sion, the adequate provision of infrastructure seems to be just as important as low taxes
and low corruption in attracting FDI. From a policy perspective, it would appear that
the right approach by governments concerned with attracting foreign direct investment
is to lower corruption and to keep taxes low but to maintain investment in infrastructure
rather than using revenue for consumption expenditures. Keeping public revenues too
low to adequately maintain or invest in infrastructure is unlikely to be a successful
long-term policy.
In fact, no single factor appears to reduce capital ﬂows volatility across the board.
For instance, economic and political stability appears to reduce the volatility of portfolio
ﬂows but increases that of other ﬂows; less competition in domestic banking systems
increases FDI’s volatility while reducing that of other ﬂows. Indeed, the results suggest
that, not only is it difﬁcult to ﬁnd a single policy track effective to reduce the volatility
of all types of ﬂows simultaneously, but the forces of globalisation have reduced the rel-
ative importance of country-speciﬁc factors in favour of global factors that are beyond
their control. However, there are some speciﬁc factors that could be effective in reduc-
ing the volatility of certain ﬂows without increasing that of others: inﬂation is robustly
and positively related with the volatility of other ﬂows; a higher volume of reserves
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tends to reduce the volatility of FDIs; the size of the banking system in terms of assets
reduces the volatility of FDIs and other ﬂows (Copaciu and Racanu, 2006, pp.1–20).
A number of countries have adopted economic stimulus packages that might have
some positive impact on global FDI ﬂows during the crisis. For example, the UK
announced a value added tax (VAT) cut, and Germany launched a ﬁnancial package to
help small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in difﬁculty to access credit. Also, the
French Government announced measures to make credit more easily available to SMEs.
The United States Federal Reserve Board has cut interests rates to a level close to zero.
More recently, Japan lowered the corporate tax rate for SMEs. For large Japanese trans-
national companies (TNCs), it decided to allow loans by the Japan Bank for Interna-
tional Cooperation to them and their foreign afﬁliates that operate in developed
countries, an extension of loans that had been previously limited to those operating in
developing countries (Wells et al., 2001, pp. 1–25). It must be noted that the internation-
alisation, from the strategic viewpoint, is of crucial importance for the SMEs. While the
expansion into new geographic markets presents an important opportunity for growth
and value creation, the implementation of such a strategy involves many unique chal-
lenges. Exporting has been traditionally regarded as the ﬁrst phase to entering the inter-
national markets. This entry strategy is particularly applicable to the internationalisation
of SMEs because the SMEs frequently lack the resources for direct investment
(Miocevic and Karanovic, 2010, p. 43). So, SMEs investments should be supported by
incentives and ﬁscal stimulus.
Economic stimulus programmes have also been set up by numerous developing
countries. Facing the negative impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis, for example, the
Chinese Government announced in November 2008 a public investment plan to boost
economic growth, which runs until the end of 2010. By enhancing growth prospects
and increasing investor conﬁdence, the plan may contribute to attracting or maintaining
FDI inﬂows to China. Though on a much smaller scale, the following countries have
adopted similar packages – India, Malaysia, Philippines, the Republic of Korea,
Thailand and Vietnam. Regarding ﬁscal stimulus, corporate tax rates have been lowered,
for instance, in the Philippines (from 35% to 30%) and the Republic of Korea (from
13–25% to 10–20%). Special measures are also provided for SMEs in such countries as
Singapore and Vietnam.
Spain was seeking to attract new FDIs to modernise its economy, after its accession
to EU. In the 1990s it introduced new legislation to make the country more attractive to
foreign investors. A range of incentives are provided at the central, regional and munici-
pal levels for a variety of purposes, including environmental protection, research and
development programmes, quality management programmes, job creation and cultural
activities. Non-residents operating in Spain through permanent establishments must
comply with tax procedures normally applicable to Spanish corporate tax (CIT) payers.
A wide range of economic incentives is offered, both by the central government and
the autonomous communities, for companies that set up operations in Spain. Incentives
include ﬁnancial subsidies, preferential access to ofﬁcial credit, bonuses for the acquisi-
tion of certain material, real estate grants, incentives for research and development, tax
deductions and exemptions, guarantee of dividends, bonuses and incentives for hiring
and training workers and low interest loans. Any ﬁrm with foreign capital has the same
access to these incentive schemes as Spanish ﬁrms. When the global ﬁnancial crisis
struck and the favourable international credit conditions suddenly disappeared, the Span-
ish economy began an inevitable adjustment process, with a substantial reduction in
consumption and investment by 2008, when housing investment plummeted. At the
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same time, the work of automatic stabilisers, the loss of the revenue windfalls obtained
during the expansion and the expansionary ﬁscal programmes put in place by the
government to mitigate the effects of the crisis, have led to a very rapid deterioration of
public accounts (Éltető, 2010, pp. 4–17).
The empiric results of Gavilán, Hernández de Cos, Jimeno, and Rojas (2011,
pp. 89–110) indicate that interest rates and demographic changes are the main changes
responsible for the investment boom and the build-up of a sizable external imbalance
(measured as the ratio of net foreign assets to gross domestic product (GDP)) witnessed
in the Spanish economy during the expansionary phase. In this context, they ﬁnd a very
limited role for ﬁscal policy in reducing the external imbalance accumulated in Spain
over the period 1998–2008. In particular, their results show that a temporary reduction
of government expenditure over the expansionary phase would have reduced the size of
the Spanish external imbalance by 2008 only very slightly. A more permanent
tightening of ﬁscal policy could have even increased this imbalance.
After 1989 the economic development of Romania was supported by various incen-
tives or beneﬁts offered to the investors, such as free trade zones, tax exemptions on
proﬁts or employees taxes, funds for low developed areas, etc. However, once Romania
has entered the European Union the number of such incentives that may be granted to
various investors has been reduced as a common legal framework for all EU countries
is intended to be applied. Moreover, most of the actual incentives need to be agreed
with the EU before being announced and applied. The most important support measures
for companies now are the EU structural funds and the state aid schemes.
Since January 1st 2004, when the Fiscal Code came into force, it has been substan-
tially amended. The Emergency Government Ordinance No. 91/2008 brings changes
with respect to investment incentives, following the provisions and trends set by the EU
legislation. The code integrates key tax legislation and provides the basis for a more
stable framework of tax legislation. These recent incentives are meant to establish a
competitive and appealing ﬁscal regime, in accordance with the ﬁscal policy regulated
by the EU.
This ﬁscal reform was coupled with a softening of the taxation principles on which
all ﬁscal procedures will be based: transparency, simplicity, partnership with taxpayers,
and prudence. Besides the above mentioned issues, the other most signiﬁcant legal
incentive offered to direct investment towards Romania is the single tax reform,
introduced by the government at the beginning of 2005.
This modiﬁcation made Romania one of the most competitive investment destina-
tions in the region. Starting in 2005, following a successful model already introduced
by other countries in the region, corporate and individual incomes are levied with a sin-
gle tax rate of 16%. The Romanian single tax rate is competitive compared to the other
countries’ levels of taxation. Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania have the lowest single
rate of 10%, with Russia at 13%.
The causes of high budget and current account deﬁcits in CEE region are explained
by excessive expensives generated by a lax monetary or ﬁscal policy. The economic lit-
erature shows that in developed countries, with open economies, both deﬁcits arise as a
result of an expansionist ﬁscal policy, the current account deﬁcit of 50% being
explained by the diminishing of the share of budgetary incomes of GDP (Botman and
Kumar, 2006, pp. 23–34).
We underline that seven of the 10 ex-Communist states that are now members of
EU, are now some of the top countries with low tax on proﬁt, under a level of 20%.
This situation can be a positive signal for the investors that came late in these countries,
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because of their political regimes. The impact of the ﬁscal frame can be best observed
in attracting foreign investments. That is why there were so many critics to Romania
when the ﬂat tax was adopted here. The foreign investments were also stimulated in
Romania by this ﬂat tax on revenue and on proﬁts of 16% starting with 2005. The value
of the FDI inﬂows in Romania in 2005–2006 was 70% higher than in the previous year,
over 9 billion euro. This amount includes the acquisition of 36.8% of the shares of
Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR) by Erste Bank (2.2 billion euro). Equity participa-
tion were the main component of the FDI inﬂows in Romania (45.1% of the total FDI),
followed by the inter-group loans (33.3% of the total FDI) and the reinvested earnings
(21.5% of the total FDI).
Still, in 2007, the FDI inﬂows in Romania decreased by 43% comparing to 2006.
The main component of FDI inﬂows in Romania was represented by reinvested earnings
(48.2% of the total FDI), followed by inter-group loans (39.6% of the total FDI) and
the equity participations (only 12.1% of the total FDI). During 2008–2010, FDIs in
Romania decreased signiﬁcantly, because of the crisis and the investors’ lack of
conﬁdence and prudence.
The FDIs amount decreased also because of the competitor markets. Bulgaria and
Hungary are two of the neighbour countries that hold some advantages into attracting
investors. The tax on proﬁt is one example. In Romania its level is 16%, while Bulgaria
has a level of 10% and Latvia and Lithuania with 15%. As far as Serbian ﬁscal incen-
tive measures are concerned it is important to emphasise that the tax on proﬁt in Serbia
is 10% since 2007, which represents one of the lowest rates in the region and is far
lower than the EU average.
Still, regarding VAT, Romania does not hold an advantage over its main competitors
in the region. Only Hungary in the CEE region has VAT of 25%, while Romania
increased VAT from 19% to 24% in the crisis context. Moreover, compared to European
developed countries Romania has one of the highest VAT rates in Europe. Only
Denmark and Sweden (that are highly developed and with high standard of living) have
a VAT rate similar to Romania (25%).
EU legislation for VAT stipulates the basic principles, but leaves the member states
some options. The EU member states that have a VAT rate below 20% are: France
(19.6%), Germany (19%), Spain (18%), Cyprus and Luxemburg (15%), Malta (18%),
the Netherlands (19%). Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Austria, Slovenia,
Slovakia and the UK have a VAT rate of 20%. EU member states that have the lowest
VAT rate of 15% are Cyprus and Luxemburg, according to European Commission –
VAT rates (2011). Other countries with a VAT rate higher than 20% are: Belgium,
Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Finland and Sweden (21–25%). The higher level of VAT (25%,)is in three EU member
states: Denmark, Sweden and Hungary. We have to mention that there are still states
that have also super reduced levels of VAT for some products, even though the EU
opinions converge to eliminate this special regime applied to some products (Spain –
4%; France – 2.1%; Ireland – 4.8%; Italy – 4%; and Luxemburg – 3%), namely food
products, books, pharmaceuticals, TV licences, supply of new buildings. Also, there is a
0 VAT level, mainly used in UK for some services. There are also exemptions of VAT
mainly for TV licences, social services, medical and dental care in many European
countries (European Commission, 2011, pp. 220–232).
In most European Union member countries a high level of the effective investment
tax rate is accompanied by a low level of FDI inﬂows as a percentage of GDP and vice
versa. In 2005, Estonia succeeded in attracting the largest stream of FDI inﬂows as a
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percentage of GDP, practicing an effective tax rate on an investment of 21.1% (higher
than those in Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Poland in the same period). The highest
effective tax rate of investment observed in Spain (36.5%) was correlated with low lev-
els of FDI inﬂows as a percentage of GDP (2.21%). In 2006, the countries with reduced
effective tax rate of investments (Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and Estonia) have
achieved a high level of FDI inﬂows to GDP. This correlation is however not valid in
all situations. For example, in Poland and Ireland, the low level of taxation on invest-
ment was not accompanied by a signiﬁcant inﬂow of FDIs.
In 2007, Bulgaria was one of the top countries that attracted the most FDIs (29.6%),
practicing the lowest effective tax rate on investment (8.8%). States where the tax rate
on investment was high (Italy, Germany, France) attracted a small volume of direct for-
eign investments (to GDP). However, Belgium and the Netherlands have recorded
inﬂows of FDIs more than the EU average, even where there is a high rate of taxation
on investment. In these countries there is, however, a special tax regime for holding
companies.
Therefore, the statistical evidence on foreign direct investment inﬂows and the taxa-
tion of investments in European Union countries cannot provide us with clear results
regarding the effects of taxation on FDI location, because there are exceptions to the
rule of inverse correlation between the two factors.
Even if the tax regime is not the only factor that determines decisions for the reloca-
tion of foreign capital, reducing corporate tax rates in some new Member States has
increased the attractiveness of these countries for foreign investors.
There is little evidence that the good economic performance of new EU states after
the reform until the crisis period was due to the taxes themselves: this could be attrib-
uted to wider macroeconomic recovery, FDI inﬂows, better tax compliance and tax
administration as a consequence of EU membership requirements. But, in the ﬁeld of
direct taxation a certain degree of tax competition is not only inevitable but also
desirable, if it take the form of a fair tax competition.
3. Methodology and results of the econometric analysis for Romania. Monetary
policy vs ﬁscal policy in Romania and their impact on FDIs
After presenting the ﬁndings in the economic literature regarding the impact of the
ﬁscal policy on FDIs, we build an empiric model to study this impact in Romanian
case, using monthly data. We used linear regression to build an equation to
determine the monthly net FDIs denominated in million euro (SOLDISD_EURO) as
an endogenous factor. We used as exogenous factors monthly data series during
January 2000 to December 2010, such as: monthly real active interest rate of the
commercial banks (MRATADOBACTIVARE) that is more signiﬁcant than the
monthly National Bank of Romania’s (NBR) reference interest rate, the variation of
the monthly domestic non-governmental credit, also denominated in million euro
(DCREDITINTERNEURO), monthly inﬂation (INFL) measured in variation of con-
sumer price index (CPI), monthly variation of direct budgetary ﬁscal taxes (DVENI-
TURIDIRECTEEURO) denominated in million euro, the variation of the monthly
ﬁscal budgetary indirect taxes denominated in million euro (DVENITURIINDIRCTE-
EURO), the variation of the monthly NBR’s ofﬁcial foreign reserves denominated in
million euro (DACTIVEEURO), monthly Romanian export denominated in million
euro (DEXTEURO), monthly import denominated in million euro (DIMPEURO),
monthly minimum reserves ratio for RON (DRATAREZMINLEI), monthly minimum
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reserves ratio for foreign currency (DRATAREZMINVAL), variation of the foreign
debt service denominated in million euro (DSDEEURO), the budgetary public spend-
ing denominated in million euro (DCHELTUIELIPUB_EURO), the variation of the
monetary base denominated in million euro (DM0EURO). So, we used real data for
all the series that appear in the equation.
We used the state budget ﬁscal revenues because they represent more than 60% of
the total ﬁscal budgetary revenues and the state budgetary spending because they repre-
sent more than 50% of the total budgetary spending. The state budget ﬁscal revenues
include the direct ﬁscal taxes such as tax on proﬁt and tax on wages and incomes (that
represent 25% of the total state budget ﬁscal revenues) and indirect taxes such as VAT
and duty taxes (that represent 75% of the total state budget ﬁscal revenues). They were
denominated in million euro to insure the comparison with the other data series and to
be expressed in real terms, just like the other data series.
The important elements for the equation have been chosen in accordance with the
results obtained at the Granger causality tests. Because of their stationary character, we
have used the ﬁrst difference of the series in the case when the ADF (Augmented
Dickey Fuller Test – data series stationary test) and PP (Pool vs. Panel Test - data series
stationary test) tests have indicated the non-stationarity.
All the series with absolute values have been changed into millions of euro for their
comparison, using the ROL-EUR exchange rate, and the interest rates have been con-
verted into monthly values, instead of yearly ones. The real exchange rate has been
obtained by correcting the nominal exchange rate with IPC cumulated with the basis in
December 1999, monthly data.
We found an auto regressive and moving average process (ARIMA) process to
determine net FDIs, using the monetary, exchange rate and ﬁscal and budgetary
factors that belong to the macroeconomic policies used for attracting FDIs all over
the world. The wages/incomes policy did not impact greatly on the FDIs, so the
monthly net average wage denominated in euro could not been introduced in this
equation. We also could not introduce into the equation the real exchange rate
RON-EUR, because it is a derived factor, just like net average wage denominated in
euro, and their impact is not signiﬁcant. These two factors inﬂuence the FDIs
through other factors used in this equation, namely: inﬂation and NBR’s ofﬁcial
reserves for real exchange rate RON-EUR and ﬁscal ratio and inﬂation for net
average wage denominated in euro.
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Dependent Variable: SOLDISD_EURO
Method: Least Squares
Date: 07/27/11 Time: 19:31
Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2010M12
Included observations: 126 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 19 iterations
MA Backcast: 2000M06
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
SOLDISD_EURO(-2) 0.298803 0.063554 4.701553 0.0000
MRATADOBACTIVARE(-2) 44.25039 7.162191 6.178331 0.0000
DCREDITINTERNEURO(-4) 0.043198 0.009650 4.476668 0.0000
DVENITURIDIRECTEEURO(-1) −0.117486 0.030713 −3.825285 0.0002
DACTIVEEURO 0.072858 0.016459 4.426525 0.0000
INFL(-2) 19.81299 7.832518 2.529581 0.0128
DVENITURIINDIRECTEEURO 0.060332 0.024270 2.485822 0.0144
DEXTEURO(-1) 0.054633 0.012405 4.404110 0.0000
DRATAREZMINVAL(-4) 12.22608 4.376845 2.793355 0.0062
DRATAREZMINLEI(-3) 22.30191 7.126374 3.129489 0.0022
DSDEEURO −0.052788 0.014033 −3.761734 0.0003
DCHELTUIELIPUB_EURO(-3) 0.032951 0.014315 2.301852 0.0232
DM0EURO(-1) −0.020618 0.010230 −2.015409 0.0463
DIMPEURO(-2) 0.020743 0.011808 1.756587 0.0818
AR(1) −0.401873 0.097648 −4.115524 0.0001
MA(1) 0.999925 0.058313 17.14748 0.0000
R-squared 0.599901 Mean dependent var 126.6329
Adjusted R-squared 0.545342 S.D. dependent var 133.7151
S.E. of regression 90.16188 Akaike info criterion 11.95926
Sum squared resid 894208.1 Schwarz criterion 12.31942
Log likelihood −737.4332 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.10558
Durbin-Watson stat 2.003652
Inverted AR Roots −.40
Inverted MA Roots −1.00
Source: E-views estimations.
The determination coefﬁcient of the equation of 0.60 proves that this is well deter-
mined, especially if we consider that we used as exogenous factors only those that
belong to the macroeconomic policies (ﬁscal, budgetary, monetary and exchange rate
policy) and some of the factors of the balance of payments (exports, imports and for-
eign debt service). Surely, FDIs are inﬂuenced by more factors; some of them could not
be measured economically. Some of the factors that inﬂuence FDIs were not considered
and they are important for attracting FDIs, such as: corruption, market transparency,
political stability, bureaucracy.
The differences between the coefﬁcients of the factors considered in the above equa-
tion come from the construction of the data series. Monthly real active interest rate of
the commercial banks, monthly inﬂation rate, monthly minimum reserves ration in RON
or in foreign currency are denominated in percent, while the other data series are
expressed in million euro.
The most important factor that inﬂuences FDIs is monthly real active interest rate of
commercial banks, which impacts on commercial banks lending in the economy. If the
interest rate increases, it attracts FDIs. Another important factor is represented by the
previous evolution of FDIs. Monthly inﬂation rate and the minimum reserves ratio in
RON and in foreign currency also impact on FDIs. If these ratios increase, they attract
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FDIs, because the nominal interest rates in the economy increase as well (Rădulescu,
2007). After them, the ﬁscal factors follow. The monthly variation of the direct ﬁscal
taxes impact negatively on FDIs, because investors are not attracted by an increase of
the tax on proﬁt or on wages/incomes. But, if the indirect ﬁscal taxes such as VAT
increase, the prices rise as well, inﬂation erupts and so are the interest rates in the
economy. So, the FDIs are attracted there by new investment opportunities and by high
proﬁts opportunities. Another factor that inﬂuences FDIs is the variation of the NBR’s
ofﬁcial foreign reserves. If they increase, they attract FDIs because the national currency
strengthens and the foreign investors become conﬁdent in that economy. After the mon-
etary and ﬁscal factors, come the factors that belong to the balance of payments. So,
monthly export impacts on FDIs positively. If the export increases, the nation currency
strengthens and investors become conﬁdent. Moreover, as we could see from the posi-
tive inﬂuence of the indirect taxes on FDIs, the foreign investors are not interested in
producing for the local market. They are much more oriented to external markets. So, if
exports increase, that attracts foreign investors. The next factor is represented by
monthly foreign debt service. If it increases, the foreign investors become prudent and
reluctant to that economy, so FDIs diminish. The domestic non-governmental credit
comes next as a factor that attracts FDIs. There is the same explication for this just like
for the other monetary factors. An increase of the non-governmental credit stimulates
investments and consumption and, moreover, that increases the inﬂation and leads to an
increase of the interest rates which attracts FDIs. Then, the state budgetary spending
comes and impacts positively on FDIs. Foreign investors are attracted by the subsidies
granted by state or by other facilities granted by state for businesses in the economy
and by large public investments in infrastructure, for example. The monthly import
effect on FDIs is also positive. For a country like Romania which depends greatly on
imports, exports and development are strongly connected to the imports. The variation
of the monthly monetary base with 1 lag denominated in million euro impacts nega-
tively on FDIs (Radulescu, et al., 2012a, pp. 435–447), because in just one month it
cannot produce a rise of the prices in the economy and a rise of non-
governmental credit or of the interest rates in order to attract FDIs. Its impact becomes
positive on FDIs after two months as we will see below from equation [2] where we
used monetary base with 2 lags.
The DW (Durbin Watson statistic – errors autocorrelation test) of 2.00 shows the
lack of ﬁrst order self-adjustment, and to be even more certain, the Q-state test is made.
The residuals graph shows the exceeding of the margin only in the second half of 2004
and at the middle of 2008. The errors are bigger in 2004–2005 when the FDIs rose sig-
niﬁcantly due to the privatisation of BCR that was bought by Erste Bank (Austria) and
the privatisation of the largest Romanian oil company Petrom which was taken over by
the Austrian Group OMV. In the same period Electrica was privatised. So, the largest
Romanian bank and the largest Romanian oil and electric companies were bought by
foreign investors in that period. Smaller errors are in the second half of 2008 when the
ﬁnancial crisis errupted and the FDIs trend inversed because the investors became reluc-
tant and prudent.
We believe that is interesting to present here, after equation [1], another similar
equation [2] that uses total state budgetary ﬁscal revenues denominated in million euro,
not its components, direct and indirect ﬁscal budgetary revenues.
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Date: 08/08/11 Time: 15:37
Sample (adjusted): 2000M07 2010M12
Included observations: 126 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 20 iterations
MA Backcast: 2000M06
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
SOLDISD_EURO(-2) 0.307991 0.060554 5.086206 0.0000
MRATADOBACTIVARE(-2) 46.40681 7.711679 6.017732 0.0000
DCREDITINTERNEURO(-4) 0.041969 0.009753 4.303157 0.0000
DVENITFISCALEURO(-1) −0.046187 0.018503 −2.496171 0.0140
DACTIVEEURO 0.068139 0.017624 3.866289 0.0002
INFL(-2) 18.89326 8.076781 2.339206 0.0211
DEXTEURO(-1) 0.050957 0.012950 3.935051 0.0001
DRATAREZMINVAL(-4) 13.47428 4.480894 3.007051 0.0033
DRATAREZMINLEI(-1) 17.70694 7.712680 2.295822 0.0236
DSDEEURO −0.043837 0.014096 −3.109981 0.0024
DM0EURO(-2) 0.023684 0.009202 2.573698 0.0114
DIMPEURO(-2) 0.020190 0.012104 1.668113 0.0981
DCHELTUIELIPUB_EURO(-3) 0.029084 0.015323 1.898029 0.0603
AR(1) −0.449532 0.094343 −4.764866 0.0000
MA(1) 0.999292 0.041998 23.79352 0.0000
R-squared 0.558377 Mean dependent var 126.6329
Adjusted R-squared 0.502677 S.D. dependent var 133.7151
S.E. of regression 94.29743 Akaike info criterion 12.04213
Sum squared resid 987012.5 Schwarz criterion 12.37978
Log likelihood −743.6541 Hannan-Quinn criter. 12.17931
Durbin-Watson stat 2.041114
Inverted AR Roots −.45
Inverted MA Roots −1.00
Source: E-views estimations.
This second equation proves that the overall impact of the ﬁscal budgetary revenues
on FDIs is negative, which means that the inﬂuence of the direct ﬁscal budgetary reve-
nues is more important than the one of the indirect budgetary ﬁscal revenues. Still, if
we do not consider the ﬁscal revenues on their two components, the determination coef-
ﬁcient is lower, 0.55. The impact of the direct ﬁscal revenues of the state budget has an
important effect in the short-term, but also in the long-term. Their impact is almost
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Figure 1. The impact of direct and indirect tax, total ﬁscal revenues and budgetary spending on
FDIs (time of impact is expressed in months on the OX axis).
Source: E-views estimations
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absorbed in 60 months, but not completely. Their important effects prove that foreign
investors are very interested in the taxation of their businesses in Romania.
The tax on proﬁt and on incomes seems to be much more important than the indi-
rect taxes such as VAT or duty taxes. Those indirect taxes greatly inﬂuence consumption
power. So, this may be a sign that foreign investors are not very interested in local con-
sumption power. They are interested in the low levels of domestic wages and in the
taxes on their proﬁts, because most of them repatriate their proﬁts, or produces in lohn
or for the foreign markets, not for the local one.
Using vector autoregressive techniques (VAR) we analysed the impact of the indirect
ﬁscal revenues of the state budget that is absorbed after 36–40 months (on OX axis). In
the frame of the ﬁscal policy, we can see that the impact of the budgetary spending is
much less than the impact of the budgetary ﬁscal incomes.
The impact of the variation of the budgetary ﬁscal revenues is absorbed after two to
three years, but not completely, while the impact of the budgetary spending is absorbed
in 18 months. So, the impact that lasts longer belongs to the budgetary ﬁscal revenues,
namely the direct taxes such as tax on proﬁt and on incomes/wages. The monetary
instruments are more important and efﬁcient for FDIs in the short run, as we could see
from the linear regression, while the ﬁscal instruments do not impact greatly but last a
few years longer (Figure 1).
The impact of the net wage is the least important factor for FDIs, because it repre-
sents a derived factor. So, the net wage depends on ﬁscal ratio and inﬂation, namely a
ﬁscal and a monetary factor. So, the wages/incomes policy is less efﬁcient than the
monetary or the ﬁscal policy and it suffers inﬂuences from both macroeconomic poli-
cies. The impact of the variation of the net wage is absorbed in ﬁve months (Figure 2).
Analysing the wage policy in Romania in the entire transition period we can see that
there are a little correlation between the minimum wage increase and the rise of the
average wage in the economy. During the last two decades there was no correlation
between the trend of the minimum wage and the number of the employees, which is not
in line with the economic theory. At the middle of the last decade, the governmental
wage policy induced a convergence of the national wage schemes to the minimum
wage. Moreover, we can say that in Romania, the average wage is far from being inﬂu-
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Figure 2. The impact of monthly net wages on FDIs (time of impact is expressed in months on
the OX axis).
Source: E-views estimations.
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4. Conclusions
For most of transitional economies, key resource is labour which is considered to have
relatively high education and training levels (comparing to regions in South-East Asia
and Latin America) and a strong scientiﬁc base. The largest FDIs were obtained here in
the frame of the privatisation process due to the higher interest rates comparative to the
developed economies. The TNCs exploited the size and growth potential of the CEE
markets, but they mainly oriented to exports and to repatriate their proﬁts (Ionita and
Pauwels, 2008).
In Romania, monetary factors such as higher interest rates and higher inﬂation
attracted FDIs. Fiscal factors seem to play a less important role, although it adopted
a ﬂat tax regime in 2005 and we have one of the least taxes on proﬁts in the CEE
region (except Bulgaria, Albania and Cyprus). The indirect taxes play a more impor-
tant role in inﬂuencing FDIs than direct taxes such as tax on proﬁts, although the
impact of the last ones last longer. The indirect taxes inﬂuence the purchasing power
of the population and this is an important factor for the entire CEE region. More-
over, in Romania, the FDIs were complementary to the domestic supply, they were
not directly mainly to sectors with high added value and to exports such as in other
CEE more developed countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland. The
inﬂuence of net wages does not seem so relevant, because net wages are a result of
the monetary and ﬁscal policy. The impact of the exchange rate also diminished in
the last decade as a result of a more stable framework on the exchange rate market.
The NBR’s interventions on this market are rarely and less important. In the light of
such ﬁndings, we are questioning if the ﬁscal policy will be efﬁcient in attracting
FDIs once Romania enters the eurozone and will abandon the monetary policy,
although the horizon of this event seems further and further away because of the
international developments in the actual crisis period. Moreover, if we consider the
other non-ﬁnancial factors, such as the lack of an adequate infrastructure or the gen-
eralised corruption in our country, the end of the privatisation process and the legal
instability, the Romanian perspectives are not good. The advantage of the low net
wages does not seem so important anymore. They are a result, not a factor for the
ﬁnancial macroeconomic policies. And the highly skilled labour has already left
Romania and works abroad. Moreover, once the EU grew, the Asian emerging mar-
kets seem closer and TNCs can think of a relocation of their business and could
leave CEE region. So, Romania, more than other CEE countries should also focus
on improving the other non-ﬁnancial factors that inﬂuence greatly the investment
environment here, so that the ﬁscal stimulus can be efﬁcient in attracting FDIs. In
the crisis context, the incentives are a big budgetary burden for all countries, devel-
oped or not and once we will adopt euro, we can no longer use the monetary
instruments that attracted FDIs in the past and the ﬁscal stimulus aren’t efﬁcient here
as the empiric analysis shows.
The other CEE more developed countries co-ﬁnanced large investment projects
using European structural funds for infrastructure, just like Spain and Portugal did after
their EU accession. They used governmental spending to attract FDIs and to support
economic growth. Romania did not manage those opportunities well. The governmental
spending is directed mainly for social purposes. The level of absorption of the European
funds in Romania is among the lowest in the European Union (around 10%). Romanian
government focused on the reduction of the corporate income tax (the lowest in the
region, except Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, as we have shown in section 2), but there
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is other tax for investors which represents a burden. And it has also increased the indi-
rect tax level, neglecting the purchasing power on the market. Moreover, the FDIs
should be complementary to the domestic investments.
So, just like Poland did, we should follow the Spanish and Portuguese example that
invested greatly in the infrastructure after its accession to the EU by using the European
funds granted after accession (for infrastructure and agriculture). That will solve many
Romanian economic problems as far as FDIs are concerned and would help Romania to
develop greatly in the future and to attract large FDIs, now that the Romanian low unit
labour costs don not represent a great advantage anymore and the multinationals’ reloca-
tion further to the East, to Asia, is more and more prominent.
This would be a solution for attracting FDIs and for sustaining economic recovery
and growth. Romania should be ready to give up its monetary autonomy, once it will
accede to European Monetary Union (EMU) and be based solely on its ﬁscal and
budgetary instruments, without jeopardising its ﬁscal requirements and stability imposed
by the nominal convergence criteria.
The conclusions of this article are in line with some of the ﬁndings in the literature
that proved the importance of fundamental factors like economic conditions and political
climate. The most serious investors are often unaware of the full range of incentives on
offer when they invest. Recent evidence has nevertheless shown that, when other factors
such as political and economic stability, infrastructure and transport costs are more or less
equal between potential locations, taxes may exert a signiﬁcant impact (Morisset and
Pirnia, 2000, pp. 1–30). While the macroeconomic determinants of FDI have been ana-
lysed to a considerable extent in past empirical work, the role of institutional factors such
as the protection of property rights and the efﬁciency of the legal system has been under-
explored for those countries. The empirical evidence (Gwenhamo 2011, pp. 211–223)
shows that property rights and political instability are consistently an important explana-
tory variable of FDI in low income countries and that should be studied also for CEE
region. Also the ﬁndings of Goodspeed, Martinez-Vazquez, and Zhang (2006, pp. 56–63)
indicate that lower taxes, lower corruption, and better infrastructure attract FDIs. In con-
clusion, the adequate provision of infrastructure seems to be just as important as low
taxes and low corruption in attracting FDI, as we have already stated in section 2.
So, an important subject for a further research should be testing the impact of non-
ﬁnancial factors on FDIs in the CEE region, but there is a limitation represented by the
way of expressing and measuring the non-ﬁnancial factors that could be used for an
empiric research. Another important direction for a future research could be to examine
more closely the effect of tax policy on the composition of FDI (greenﬁeld, reinvested
earnings and mergers and acquisition). This way, the policymakers in host countries
would have a better chance of attracting the right type of investments and maximising
their impact on the economy.
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